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LOGICAL PRE- AND POST-SELECTION PARADOXES,
MEASUREMENT-DISTURBANCE AND CONTEXTUALITY
M. S. LEIFER AND R. W. SPEKKENS
Abstract. Many seemingly paradoxical effects are known in the predictions
for outcomes of measurements made on pre- and post-selected quantum sys-
tems. A class of such effects, which we call “logical pre- and post-selection
paradoxes”, bear a striking resemblance to proofs of the Bell-Kochen-Specker
theorem, which suggests that they demonstrate the contextuality of quantum
mechanics. Despite the apparent similarity, we show that such effects can
occur in noncontextual hidden variable theories, provided measurements are
allowed to disturb the values of the hidden variables.
1. Introduction
The study of quantum systems that are both pre- and post-selected was initiated
by Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz (ABL) (Aharonov et al., 1964), and has led
to the discovery of many counter-intuitive results, which we call Pre- and Post-
Selection (PPS) paradoxes1. These results have led to a long debate about the
interpretation of the ABL probability rule2.
An undercurrent in this debate has been the connection between PPS paradoxes
and contextuality. Bub and Brown (1986) understood the first paper describing
a PPS paradox, that of Albert et al. (1985), as a claim to a novel proof of the
contextuality of Hidden Variable Theories (HVTs), that is, as a version of the Bell-
Kochen Specker theorem (Bell, 1966; Kochen and Specker, 1967), and convincingly
disputed this claim. Although the language of Albert et al. (1985) does suggest
such a reading3, in Albert et al. (1986) these authors clarified their position, stating
that it was not their intention to conclude anything about HVTs. Nonetheless,
discussions of PPS paradoxes continue to make use of a language that suggests
implications for ontology (Vaidman, 1999) and there are explicit claims that PPS
paradoxes are proofs of contextuality (Marchildon, 2003).
In this paper, we show that PPS paradoxes can be explained without invoking
contextuality if one allows that measurement interactions can cause a disturbance to
the values of the hidden variables of the system; a possibility that is often overlooked
in analyses of PPS paradoxes. The paper is organized as follows. After introducing
a general form of the ABL rule, we give a simple example of how the surprising
Date: October 31, 2004.
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1For a recent review of these results see Aharonov and Vaidman (2002).
2See Kastner (2003) and references therein.
3For instance, it is stated that “The assumption of Gleason and of Kochen and Specker [...] is
not satisfied by quantum mechanical systems within the interval between two measurements!”
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features of a particular PPS paradox, known as the three-box paradox, can be re-
produced in a simple noncontextual model that involves measurement-disturbance.
Thereafter, we consider the analogue of the ABL rule for HVTs, introduce the as-
sumption of noncontextuality, and introduce the notion of a “logical” PPS paradox.
We then show how PPS paradoxes of this type are consistent with noncontextu-
ality if one allows for measurement-disturbance. We end the paper with a brief
discussion of how a recent theorem that connects logical PPS paradoxes to proofs
of contextuality (Leifer and Spekkens, 2004) appears in light of our results.
2. Pre- and Post-Selection in Quantum Theory
2.1. Quantum Measurements. We consider a finite dimensional Hilbert space
and assume that no evolution occurs between measurements. The outcome of a
quantum measurement, M, is a random variable, which we denote by XM. We
restrict attention to the case where the range of XM is a discrete set labelled by j.
A measurement has both a statistical aspect, which specifies the probability of
obtaining the different outcomes of the measurement for any given density operator,
and a transformation aspect, which specifies how the quantum state is updated as
a result of the measurement. We restrict our attention to sharp measurements,
that is, those associated with projector valued measures (PVMs) (sets of projectors
{PMj } that sum to the identity operator,
∑
j P
M
j = I). The probability of obtaining
outcome XM = j when the initial density matrix is ρ is then given by pρ(XM =
j) = Tr
(
PMj ρ
)
. The most general possible transformation aspect of M is given by
a set of completely positive (CP) maps {EMj } satisfying
(1) EM #j (I) = P
M
j
where E# is the dual of E defined by Tr
(
E#(A)B
)
= Tr (AE(B)). The updated
state on obtaining outcome XM = j is
(2) ρ|XM =j =
EMj (ρ)
Tr
(
EMj (ρ)
) .
When EMj (ρ) = P
M
j ρP
M
j , the transformation is said to follow the Lu¨ders rule
(Lu¨ders, 1951).
2.2. Pre- and Post-Selected Systems. Imagine an initial, an intermediate, and
a final measurement occurring at times tpre, t, and tpost respectively, where tpre <
t < tpost. We pre-select (post-select) by conditioning on a particular outcome of
the initial (final) measurement. Denote the occurrence of this outcome by Apre
(Apost), and suppose that it is associated with a projector Πpre (Πpost). Let the
intermediate measurement be denoted by M.
Assuming that the density operator prior to tpre is I/d, and assuming Lu¨ders rule
for the initial measurement, the density operator after tpre is ρpre = Πpre/Tr(Πpre).
By Bayes’ theorem, we can deduce that the probability of obtaining the outcome k
for M is
(3) pABL(XM = k|Apre,Apost,M) =
Tr(ΠpostE
M
k (Πpre))
Tr(ΠpostEMk (Πpre) + ΠpostE
M
¬k(Πpre))
where EM¬k(ρ) =
∑
j 6=k E
M
j (ρ). We refer to this as the ABL probability rule (see
Aharonov and Vaidman, 2002). From now on, unless stated otherwise, the Lu¨ders
update rule is assumed to apply for all intermediate measurements. In this case,
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EMk (ρ) = P
M
k ρP
M
k . Note that, unlike the standard Born rule probability, the ABL
probability depends, through EM¬k, on the entire PVM {P
M
j } and not just on the
projector PMk that is associated with the outcome for which the probability is being
computed. This will be critical further on.
2.3. The Three-Box Paradox. A simple example of the seemingly paradoxical
predictions of the ABL rule is the three-box paradox (see Aharonov and Vaidman,
2002). Suppose we have a particle that can be in one of three boxes. We label
the state where the particle is in box j by |j〉. The particle is pre-selected in the
state |φ〉 = 1√
3
(|1〉+ |2〉+ |3〉), i.e. Πpre = |φ〉〈φ|, and post-selected in the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|1〉+ |2〉 − |3〉), i.e. Πpost = |ψ〉〈ψ|. At an intermediate time, we either
determine whether the particle is in box 1 or not, or we determine whether it is
in box 2 or not. The first measurement, M, corresponds to the PVM {PM1 , P
M
2 },
where
(4) PM1 = |1〉 〈1| P
M
2 = |2〉 〈2|+ |3〉 〈3| .
For this measurement, pABL(XM = 1|Apre,Apost,M) = 1.
The second measurement, N, corresponds to the PVM = {PN1 , P
N
2 }, where
(5) PN1 = |2〉 〈2| P
N
2 = |1〉 〈1|+ |3〉 〈3|
In this case, pABL(XN = 1|Apre,Apost,N) = 1.
Thus, if we ask whether or not the particle was in box 1, we find that it was in
box 1 with certainty, and if we ask whether or not it was in box 2, we find that it
was in box 2 with certainty!
2.4. An Analogue of the three-box paradox. Following the spirit of previ-
ous work by Kirkpatrick (2003), we present a simple toy model that parallels the
features of the three-box paradox.
Consider an opaque box that can be divided into two opaque boxes by placing
a double partition in the box and breaking it into two halves. It is also possible to
put the two halves back together and to remove the partition. The partition can be
placed in two possible positions, dividing the box either into front and back halves
or into right and left halves. Suppose there is a ball inside the box. One can verify
whether the ball is in the front half of the box by dividing the box into front and
back halves and then shaking the front half of the box to hear whether the ball
is inside. If the ball is found in the front then this action completely randomizes
the left-right position of the ball. However, if it is not found in the front then its
position remains undisturbed because the back half has not been shaken. A similar
procedure can be used to verify whether the ball is in the back half of the box, only
in this case the left-right position gets randomized if the ball is in the back and is
left undisturbed if it is in the front. Two further procedures can be used to verify
whether the ball is in the left or right half of the box, randomizing the front-back
position of the ball whenever it is found in the half that one is checking.
Now imagine that one pre-selects on finding the ball in the front upon checking
for it there, and one post-selects on finding the ball in the back upon checking for it
there. Suppose that the two possible intermediate measurements are: 1) checking
to see if the ball is on the left, and 2) checking to see if the ball is on the right.
Clearly, if one checked to see if it was on the left, then one must have found it on
the left, since otherwise there would have been no disturbance and consequently
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no way for the ball to have moved from the front to the back of the box. But, by
the same argument, if one checked to see if it was on the right, then one must have
found it on the right.
This model succeeds at reproducing the surprising feature of the three-box para-
dox, while being noncontextual according to the operational definition provided in
Spekkens (2004a) (which we shall discuss further on). Moreover, it is clear the
measurement-induced disturbance is critical to achieving the surprising results.
In the rest of the paper, we show that this result is generic; PPS paradoxes do not
require contextuality for their explanation but do require measurement-disturbance.
The demonstration requires us to examine explicitly how PPS scenarios are treated
within an HVT.
3. Hidden Variable Theories
3.1. Measurements in Hidden Variable Theories. An HVT is an attempt to
understand quantum measurements as revealing features of ontic states, by which
we mean complete specifications of the state of reality. Let Ω be the set of all ontic
states in an HVT. Although λ ∈ Ω are the states of reality, we may not have direct
access to them (hence the term hidden variables), and so quantum mechanical
preparation procedures generally correspond to probability distributions over the
ontic states. We denote these by functions µ : Ω→ R+ satisfying
∫
Ω
µ(λ)dλ = 1. 4
A common assumption that is made for HVTs is that the ontic state determines
the outcomes of all possible sharp measurements uniquely. We refer to this as-
sumption as outcome determinism for sharp measurements, and we presume it to
hold in all that follows. Given this assumption, the statistical aspect of a measure-
ment M is represented by a set of idempotent indicator functions χMj : Ω→ {0, 1},
that sum to the unit function
∑
j χ
M
j (λ) = 1. χ
M
j (ω) is the probability (0 or 1) of
obtaining outcome j given that the ontic state is λ. More generally
(6) pµ(XM = j) =
∫
Ω
χMj (λ)µ(λ)dλ
is the probability of obtaining the outcome j given the distribution µ.
We now turn to the transformation aspect of measurements. We must allow for
the possibility that measurements cause a disturbance (possibly stochastic) to the
ontic state of the system. Therefore, the disturbance induced by a measurement is
described by a transition matrix DMj : Ω× Ω → R+ satisfying
∫
Ω
DMj (λ, ω)dλ = 1.
DMj (λ, ω) is the probability of a transition from ω to λ, given that XM = j.
Thus, the most general transformation aspect of a measurement M on obtaining
outcome j is composed of both a Bayesian updating of the distribution and a dis-
turbance, and is consequently represented by a norm-decreasing transition matrix
(7) ΓMj (λ, ω) = D
M
j (λ, ω)χ
M
j (ω).
This plays an analogous role in the HVT to the trace-decreasing CP map associated
with a measurement outcome in quantum theory. In particular, it satisfies
(8)
∫
Ω
ΓMj (λ, ω)dλ = χ
M
j (ω),
4We assume that Ω satisfies the measure-theoretic requirements necessary to make such inte-
grals well-defined.
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which is the analogue of Eq. (1). We have the following update rule for the proba-
bility density on obtaining XM = j
(9) µ(λ|XM = j) =
∫
ω
ΓMj (λ, ω)µ(ω)dω∫
Ω
ΓMj (λ, ω)µ(ω)dωdλ
,
which is the analogue of Eq. (2).
3.2. Pre- and Post-Selection in Hidden Variable Theories. Pre- and post-
selected systems can be described in an HVT as follows. The successful pre-selection
event, Apre, is associated with a probability distribution µpre(λ). The intermediate
measurement, M, is described by a set of indicator functions {χMj } and corre-
sponding transition matrices {ΓMj } and the successful post-selection event, Apost
is associated with an indicator function χpost. Applying Bayes’ rule together with
Eqs. (6) and (9) we obtain the PPS probability rule for HVTs
(10)
pHVT(XM = k|Apre,Apost,M) =
∫
Ω
χpost(λ)Γ
M
k (λ, ω)µpre(ω)dωdλ∫
Ω
χpost(λ)(ΓMk (λ, ω) + Γ
M
¬k(λ, ω))µpre(ω)dωdλ
.
where ΓM¬k(λ, ω) =
∑
j 6=k Γ
M
j (λ, ω). This is the analogue of Eq. (3).
3.3. Measurement noncontextuality. A particularly natural class of HVTs are
the Measurement Noncontextual Hidden Variable Theories (MNHVTs) (see Spekkens,
2004a, for a discussion of different types of noncontextuality). The assumption of
measurement noncontextuality is that if there is an outcome k of a measurement
M and an outcome j of a measurement N that have the same probability for all
possible preparations, then they must be represented by the same indicator func-
tion in the HVT. For quantum systems, this will be the case if and only if both
the outcomes correspond to the same projector P , even though M and N may be
associated with different PVMs. Thus, noncontextuality implies that the indicator
functions in both cases depend only on the projector P, i.e.
(11) χMk (λ) = χ
N
j (λ) = χP (λ).
Equivalently, in an MNHVT, every projector is associated with a unique indicator
function (defining a unique subset of Ω) which specifies the property that is revealed
by a measurement of that projector.
This implies stringent constraints on the probabilities that can be simultaneously
assigned to commuting projectors. For instance, since any pair of orthogonal pro-
jectors Q1, Q2 can appear together in the same PVM, it follows that χQ1 +χQ2 ≤ 1
and consequently that χQ1χQ2 = 0 (where we leave the dependence of χ on λ
implicit). Moreover, if Q = Q1 + Q2, then Q is a coarse-graining of Q1 and
Q2, and therefore is represented in the HVT by χQ = χQ1 + χQ2 . Given these
identities, it follows that, for commuting projectors P and Q, χPχQ = χPQ and
χP + χQ − χPχQ = χP+Q−PQ. Finally, the projector onto the null space, Pnull, is
represented by χPnull = 0 since the associated property never holds. Denoting the
probability one assigns to P given a distribution µ(λ), by p(P ) =
∫
Ω
χP (λ)µ(λ)dλ,
we obtain the following constraints
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Algebraic conditions: For projectors P,Q such that [P,Q] = 0,
0 ≤ p(P ) ≤ 1(12)
p(I − P ) = 1− p(P ),(13)
p(I) = 1, p(Pnull) = 0,(14)
p(PQ) ≤ p(P ), p(PQ) ≤ p(Q),(15)
p(P +Q− PQ) = p(P ) + p(Q)− p(PQ).(16)
If one conditions on a particular ontic state ω, so that µ(λ) = δ(λ − ω) and
p(P ) = χP (ω), then all of these probabilities must be either 0 or 1. However, the
Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem shows that there are sets of projectors for which there
are no assignments of probabilities 0 or 1 that satisfy the algebraic conditions. This
is an example of a proof of contextuality.
We are now in a position to make precise what it is about PPS paradoxes that
suggests that these might have something to do with measurement contextuality.
The critical fact is that there exist sets of projectors that are each assigned proba-
bility 0 or 1 by the ABL rule such that the overall probability assignment violates
the algebraic conditions. The three box paradox is an example of this. We call
any such case a logical PPS paradox.
First of all, let us clarify why, in the absence of the measurement noncontextuality
assumption , logical PPS paradoxes do not violate classical probability theory. The
reason is that only assignments that are similarly conditioned need to respect the
algebraic constraints, and when one conditions on the nature of the intermediate
measurement, the ABL probabilities do satisfy the constraints. It is only if we
consider ABL probabilities for different intermediate measurements together that
we find that these probabilities do not satisfy the functional relations defined in Eqs.
(12) to (16). (For instance, we considered two distinct intermediate measurements
in the three box paradox.) Similarly, one can avoid a contradiction in a HVT by
assuming that indicator functions depend on measurement context. In this case, a
projector is not associated with a unique indicator function and consequently can
be assigned different probabilities in different measurement contexts.
This way of describing things suggests that logical PPS paradoxes are them-
selves proofs of the impossibility of an MNHVT. This only follows however if the
dependence of the ABL probabilities on context implies a similar dependence of
the indicator functions on context, equivalently, if context dependence of probabil-
ities that are conditioned on a pre- and post-selection of measurement outcomes
implies context dependence for probabilities that are conditioned on a particular
ontic state.
Since the HVTmust reproduce the ABL probabilities, we can infer that pHVT(XM =
k|Apre,Apost,M) must be context-dependent. However, this does not immediately
imply context-dependence for the indicator functions. One possible reason for this is
that pHVT(XM = k|Apre,Apost,M) depends on the transition matrices {Γ
M
j (λ, ω)},
and thus, given Eq. (7), it depends not only on the indicator functions {χMj (λ)}, but
also on the transition matrices for the disturbance, {DMj (λ, ω)}. We must therefore
begin by analysing the possibility of context-dependence of the DMj (λ, ω).
3.4. Transformation noncontextuality. In Spekkens (2004a), the notion of non-
contextuality is generalized to transformations. Transformation noncontextuality
is the assumption that equivalent transformations (i.e. those represented by the
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same CP map in the quantum formalism) are associated with the same transition
matrix in an HVT. Thus, if outcome k of a measurement M and outcome j of a
measurement N are both associated with the CP-map E , then
(17) ΓMk (λ, ω) = Γ
N
j (λ, ω) = ΓE(λ, ω).
If the measurement is sharp, that is, associated with a projector P, and the CP
map E corresponds to the Lu¨ders rule, that is, E(ρ) = PρP, then a dependence
on E is simply a dependence on P. In this case, the assumption of transforma-
tion noncontextuality is that ΓMk (λ, ω) = Γ
N
j (λ, ω) = ΓP (λ, ω). By Eq. (8), it
follows that χMk (λ) = χ
N
j = χP (λ). Thus, for Lu¨ders rule measurements, trans-
formation noncontextuality implies measurement noncontextuality. So if we can
show that transformation noncontextuality is consistent with the existence of log-
ical PPS paradoxes, then we have also shown that measurement noncontextuality
is consistent with their existence.
4. Main results
As noted below eq. (3), pABL(XM = k|Apre,Apost,M) depends on the identity
of the entire PVM {PMj } associated with M and not just on the projector P
M
k
associated with the outcome k. Consequently, if the HVT is to reproduce the ABL
predictions, pHVT(XM = k|Apre,Apost,M) must also depend on {P
M
j } and not just
on PMk . We will show that such a dependence can be achieved even under the
assumption of transformation noncontextuality.
First note that the presence of ΓM¬k(λ, ω) in Eq. (10) shows that the PPS proba-
bility for HVTs can have a dependence on the PVM even under the assumption of
transformation noncontextuality, since ΓM¬k(λ, ω) =
∑
j 6=k Γ
M
j (λ, ω) =
∑
j 6=k ΓPMj (λ, ω)
depends on the entire PVM. We now show that it must have such a dependence.
Suppose M and N are associated with distinct PVMs, {PMj } and {P
N
j } where
PMk = P
N
k = P for some k. Suppose further that the CP maps for each outcome
are described by the Lu¨ders rule, so that the effective CP maps associated with the
“not k” outcome are EM¬k(·) =
∑
j 6=k P
M
j (·)P
M
j and E
N
¬k(·) =
∑
j 6=k P
N
j (·)P
N
j . The
distinctness of {PMj } and {P
N
j } then implies that E
M
¬k and E
N
¬k are distinct, which
in turn implies that there is some density operator ρ that is mapped to distinct
density operators by EM¬k and E
N
¬k. Consequently, there must be some distribution
µ(λ) that is mapped to distinct distributions by ΓM¬k(λ, ω) and Γ
N
¬k(λ, ω). However,
this is only possible if ΓM¬k(λ, ω) and Γ
N
¬k(λ, ω) are themselves distinct transition
matrices. Being distinct, they cannot depend only on P, but must depend on the
full PVM. This concludes the proof.
Finally, we prove that any transformation noncontextual HVT that can repro-
duce the ABL predictions (of which logical PPS paradoxes are an example) must
involve measurement-disturbance.
We assume the contrary and derive a contradiction. If a measurement involves no
disturbance in a HVT, then ΓMk (λ, ω) = δ(λ − ω)χ
M
k (ω) (which is simply Bayesian
updating). As noted above, pHVT(XM = k|Apre,Apost,M) must depend on the
full PVM rather than just PMk to reproduce pABL(XM = k|Apre,Apost,M). Now,
consider the pair of measurements M and N introduced above. Since ΓMk and Γ
N
k
depend only on P (by virtue of transformation noncontextuality), it follows that ΓM¬k
and ΓN¬k must depend on the PVM. The absence of measurement-disturbance would
imply ΓM¬k(λ, ω) = δ(λ− ω)
∑
j 6=k χ
M
j (λ) and Γ
N
¬k = δ(λ− ω)
∑
j 6=k χ
N
j (λ). But by
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the assumption of measurement noncontextuality,
∑
j 6=k χ
M
j (λ) =
∑
j 6=k χ
N
j (λ) =
χI−P (λ), which implies that ΓM¬k(λ, ω) = Γ
N
¬k(λ, ω). However, if the transition
matrices are the same, then they do not depend on the PVM context, and this
contradicts the assumption that the HVT reproduces the predictions of the ABL
rule. This concludes the proof.
5. Outlook
We have shown that the existence of logical PPS paradoxes in a theory does
not imply contextuality, which would seem to suggest that the two phenomena
are unrelated. However, we recently proved a theorem (Leifer and Spekkens, 2004)
showing that the mathematical structure of every logical PPS paradox in quantum
mechanics is sufficient to construct a proof of contextuality. This does not contra-
dict the results presented here because we did not show that a logical PPS paradox
is itself a proof of contextuality; measurements that are temporal successors in the
PPS paradox must be treated as counterfactual alternatives in the proof of con-
textuality. This distinction is critical, since an earlier measurement can cause a
disturbance to the ontic state that is monitored by a later measurement, whereas
the possibility of having implemented a different measurement cannot disturb the
ontic state of the system in the actual measurement.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that within the framework of HVTs satisfy-
ing additional constraints, one might find a closer connection between PPS para-
doxes and contextuality. For instance, in the model of §2.4 there is no analogue of
the uncertainty principle, since there is a nonzero probability of ascertaining both
the left-right and front-back position of the ball without disturbing it in any way.
Meanwhile, a toy theory that is noncontextual (by the operational definition of
Spekkens, 2004a) and that does include a strong analogue of the uncertainty prin-
ciple, that of Spekkens (2004b), seems to be devoid of logical PPS paradoxes. This
suggests that there may be a natural set of conditions that both quantum theory
and the toy theory of Spekkens (2004b) satisfy, but that the model of §2.4 and other
HVTs do not satisfy, under which contextuality and logical PPS paradoxes are ei-
ther both present or both absent. We expect that some of the quantum structures
discussed at this conference might provide the appropriate setting to address this
question.
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